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BOOK REVIEWS
By Philip B. Kurland.*
AND THE CONSTITUTION.
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois. 1978. Pp. 261.
Reviewed by Ilona Modly Hogant and Lawrence J. Hogan.t
WATERGATE

University of Chicago Law School Professor Philip Kurland
begins his preface by saying that this series of essays is meant for
nonlawyers. In the words of Publishers Weekly, "[i]t will be a hardy
layperson who will make his or her way through it."'

Twenty-four

pages containing approximately 754 footnotes make this volume
very much a constitutional lawyer's research tool. Even at that, it is
advisable to read the volume essay by essay in order to maintain
interest as the author himself states that the essay form has allowed
"for repetition of the same themes in different contexts" (p. ix). This
repetition is evident throughout, particularly in the citations of
historical and legal precedents, which provide the background for
each essay topic ranging from the "Congressional Power of Inquiry"
to "The Plebiscitary Presidency."
Because of your reviewers' personal involvement in the impeachment process, 2 the scope of this review will emphasize the essays on
"Impeachments" and "Presidential Prosecutions and Presidential
Pardons." Together with the essays on "Separation of Powers and
Checks and Balances" and "The Plebiscitary Presidency," they form
the foundation for linking the events of 1972 through 1974 to an
exposition of constitutional law. The remaining essays, while in part
repetitive of the four chosen for review here, also appear to serve
more as a forum for Professor Kurland's scholarly interest and
academic expertise in the field of constitutional law than for their
direct relationship to the topic of Watergate and the Constitution.
Your reviewers and the author approached the topics of
impeachments and presidential pardons from diametrically opposing viewpoints and yet, through independent legal analysis, reached
strikingly similar conclusions on the issues. For example, Professor
Kurland, by way of introduction, states that he did not try to tell the
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Philip B. Kurland is the William R. Kenan, Jr., Distinguished Service Professor atthe
University of Chicago where since 1956 he has been professor of law.
B.A., 1969, George Washington University; J.D., 1974, Georgetown University;
practicing attorney and member of the Maryland and District of Columbia Bar
Associations; Congressional Legislative Assistant from 1969 to 1973.
B.A., 1949, Georgetown University; J.D., 1954, Georgetown University; M.A., 1965,
American University; County Executive, Prince George's County, Maryland;
represented the Fifth Congressional District of Maryland in the United States House
of Representatives from 1969 to 1975 and served on the House Judiciary Committee
from 1970 to 1975.
See Publishers Weekly, March 20, 1978.
During his service on the House Judiciary Committee, Mr. Hogan participated in the
impeachment proceedings against President Richard M. Nixon.
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"inside story" of Watergate. "I could not, if I would. I was never on
the inside: not of the Senate Select Committee; not of the special
prosecutor's office; not of the judicial proceedings; nor yet of the
House Judiciary Committee" (p. 1). One of your reviewers, on the other
hand, was a member of that House Judiciary Committee and
subsequently the author of a law review article entitled, "The
Impeachment Inquiry of 1974: A Personal View." 3
Further, in his final essay, Professor Kurland tells the reader
forthrightly from whence his prejudices spring:
It seems to be harder for academics than for poets to avoid
self-righteousness, not to be disdainful of those who are
professionally engaged in politics or business, which most of
us eschew, except as kibitzers. Politicians' motives, especially, cannot be nearly so pure as our own, and hindsight
constantly demonstrates to us the fallibility, if not venality, of those persons in the "real world."
. . . Attempting - without entire success - to put to one
side my long and deep-seated distaste for the person of
Richard Nixon, I conclude . . . (p. 201).
In contrast, your reviewer who served on the House Judiciary
Committee, wrote: "As a member of that Committee, I personally felt
the weight of that constitutional test and perceived its dangers."' 4 "A
sense of being unable to escape history remained with me
throughout the proceedings." 5 "Despite the inherently 'political'
nature of the impeachment process, I chose to approach the entire
matter, as best I could, from a purely legal standpoint." 6 "The body
of evidence fell into place one piece after another, finally demolishing the presumption of innocence that I had gladly given the
President. ' 7 "That one vote changed my life as well as Richard
Nixon's."
Professor Kurland's chapter on "Impeachments" has been called
by one fellow lawyer "the best brief essay on the concept in print." 9
Indeed, had it been available during the deliberations of the House
Judiciary Committee in 1974, it would have served as an invaluable
research tool for the thirty-eight Committee members, all of whom
were required to be lawyers before becoming eligible for appointment

3. L. Hogan, The ImpeachmentInquiry of 1974: A PersonalView, 63 GEORGETOWN L.J.
1051 (1975).
4. Id.

5. Id.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 1052.
Id. at 1061.
Id.at 1063.
64 A.B.A. JOURNAL 1732 (November 1978).
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to the Committee. His discussion on impeachments begins where
each member of the House Judiciary Committee began, and that is,
with no guidance from past Supreme Court opinions and with very
little legal precedent on the meaning of article 2, section 410 of the
Constitution. Thus an impeachment panel can rely only on the
actual words of the Constitution and come to its own interpretation
of those words, particularly the rather vague phrase, "other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors." Professor Kurland concludes, as did the
1974 impeachment panel, that impeachments need not be based on
indictable offenses. Rather, the American impeachment process is
basically a political process for removal and not an alternative to
criminal proceedings. In keeping with the primary sanction of
removal from office, it is logical that the essence of an impeachable
offense was thought by the framers of the Constitution to be a
corrupt breach of the public trust and not a per se violation of the
criminal laws. In reviewing The Federalist Papers on this subject,
Professor Kurland notes that James Madison "also voiced an
opinion that would have forestalled the 'Saturday night massacre,'
when he told his fellow congressmen that an unwarranted removal
from office by the President of a worthy official would warrant
impeachment of the President" (p. 114).
The only presidential impeachment to provide any semblance of
legal precedent was that of Andrew Johnson in 1868. But the author,
as did the impeachment committee of 1974, found little usefulness in
the proceedings of that House impeachment and Senate trial.
Professor Kurland in fact lauds the 1974 committee for not proceeding in the manner of the 1868 Congress:
The House Judiciary Committee, which was charged with
determining whether charges of impeachment should be
brought against President Nixon, proceeded deliberately,
judiciously, and conscientiously in its task. No one can read
the proceedings of the committee without crediting it with
commitment to constitutional standards. The House of
Representatives of 1974 was not the House of Representatives of 1868 (p. 119).
Finally, Professor Kurland questions whether there could have
been an appeal to the courts from a Senate judgment of conviction.
He answers with an emphatic "no" as judicial review was never
contemplated by those who wrote the Constitution; but he also

10. U.S.

CONST.

art. II, § 4 provides as follows:

The President, Vice President and all Civil Officers of the United States,
shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of,
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.
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recognized that "the enhanced self-image of the American judiciary
today" might well lead it to undertake such review and decision were
the opportunity presented, as it was not with the resignation of
Richard M. Nixon in 1974.
In his essay on "Presidential Prosecutions and Presidential
Pardons," the author concludes that the President of the United
States must be immune from criminal prosecution during his term of
office (p. 135). While others may dispute this conclusion, the author
also contends that there should be no doubt that a removed or retired
or resigned President is vulnerable to the criminal processes. Thus, it
was that on September 8, 1974, President Gerald R. Ford pardoned
Richard M. Nixon, and "[w]ith this stroke of the pen, he freed Nixon
from liability for his federal crimes and probably doomed his own
chances for election to office in his own right" (p. 136). Professor
Kurland further notes that "[i]n November of 1976, Mr. Ford may
well have answered to the people for the 'mercy' he dispensed in
1974" (p. 152).
Immediately, the attacks on the Nixon pardon were many. Once
again, your reviewer sat on the House Judiciary Committee when
President Gerald R. Ford voluntarily came before the Committee to
explain his pardon of his predecessor. But, as with the impeachment
process itself, pardons are so much a purely political tool that it was
difficult to address the precise legal questions raised by a pardon of
a resigned president. Professor Kurland concludes that "none of
these objections could reach the level of substantial legal doubt as to
the validity of the pardon. They all spoke rather to the bad judgment
of the man who offered it" (p. 143).
The major legal arguments against the granting of the pardon
were grounded on the, issue of prematurity because the pardon
preceded conviction and the filing of any charges of criminality (pp.
143-44). Furthermore, the pardon failed to conform to the regulations
of the Department of Justice. The issue of prematurity was, however,
addressed both by President Ford in his statement to the Judiciary
Committee on October 17, 1974, and by the questions of Committee
members subsequent thereto. In the course of that hearing, your
reviewer noted particularly that
[w]e also know from the debates of the framers of the
Constitution that they specifically rejected including in the
Constitution the words 'after conviction.' They also, in the
debate at that time, indicated situations where it might be
necessary or desirable to grant a pardon even before
indictment, as was the case in this instance.1"

11.

HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, PARDON OF RICHARD M. NIXON AND RELATED
MATTERS, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 109 (1974).
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The final essays on "Separation of Powers and Checks and
Balances," "Reforms," and "The Plebiscitary Presidency" provide
the forum for Professor Kurland's dismal conclusion that inadequate
congressional oversight of the executive branch and too much power
in the White House staff caused the constitutional deficiencies
revealed by Watergate and that nothing has been done in the
aftermath to cure those deficiencies. Whether the deficiencies stem
from the failure of the constitutional system of checks and balances
or from the growth of the "imperial presidency," the author gives
credit to Archibald Cox for his accurate diagnosis of the affliction
when Cox explained in 1976 to a Canadian audience that the
essential constitutional questions of Watergate derived from the
expanded power of the presidency.1 2 As "proof' that reform has yet
to take place, Professor Kurland points to the fact that the Carter
White House staff was at first drastically enlarged and that many
staffers "are salaried at the highest government levels, in excess of
salaries paid to the Haldemans, Ehrlichmens, Deans, and Magruders of an earlier White House, and far in excess of their earnings
before they joined the Carter bandwagon in its early stages" (p. 199).
More frightening, however, than the author's description of the
current state of the White House staff is his revealing and all too
true description of the massive federal bureaucracy:
The result of this Supreme Court license and congressional
irresponsibility is that the nation is now governed essentially, not by laws enacted by Congress, but by rules and
regulations promulgated by the executive branch and by
independent agency actions, purporting to be in compliance
with the congressional will, i.e., where congressional will
can be derived from something besides silence, but frequently in opposition to it. With this greatly expanded
governmental function, the executive branch has become a
series of bureaucracies uncontrolled even by the upper
echelons of executive officials and only occasionally subjected to judicial scrutiny (p. 176).
Finally, the only Watergate-era "reform" to which the author
can point is the public funding of national elections. Whether public
financing can be considered a reform at all is questionable. Yet, it is
interesting to note that H.R. 1, the first bill to be introduced in the
United States House of Representatives in the 96th Congress
convened on January 15, 1979, deals, once again, with just that
13
subject matter.

12. See 26 U. TORONTO L.J. 125 (1976).
13. See CONG. REC., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 15, 1979).

